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Should Indonesia join the Trans-Pacific Partnership? 
Pipin Prasetyono & Agung Wibowo 
Introduction 
In October 2015, 12 Pacific Rim economies reached a conclusion to establish a new free-
trade agreement, namely the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). With the United States as 
the main actor, TPP is a comprehensive free trade agreement covering liberalisation in all 
sectors such as goods, services and investment in scheduled and legally binding manners 
(Abboushi 2015, pp. 148-152). On the other hand, during his visit to Washington DC in 
the late of October 2015, President of Indonesia Mr. Joko Widodo officially declared 
Indonesia’s intention to join the TPP (Tau 2015). In response to this statement, domestic 
reactions were mixed. The supporters, who mostly are government officials, argue that 
by joining the TPP, Indonesia could speed up its development through broader trade 
openness and enhanced investment opportunity (Amindoni 2016). 
In contrast, the opposing side considers the current domestic industries’ competitiveness 
level compared to other TPP members which is regarded as relatively low. Surprisingly, 
this opposing argument comes from the academia group that argues the risks of imported 
goods flood from other TPP members. The increase in imported goods, thus, will have no 
benefit to domestic industries as they could be hurtful. Hence a question mark whether 
Indonesia should join the TPP or not (Amianti & Parlina 2015). Against this background, 
this paper is aimed to identify the economic benefits and challenges of joining the TPP 
for Indonesia. This paper argues that Indonesia should join the TPP, given the vast and 
wide opportunities of new market expansion. However, to optimally reap the benefits 
from the TPP, Indonesia should also focus to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic 
industries.  
Literature Review  
(1) What is TPP? 
After reaching a conclusion in establishing the TPP on October 2015, 12 TPP countries 
include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam signed the finalised TPP 
agreement on 4 February 2016. Initially designed as a Pacific region trade agreement, the 
TPP has five features to cope both issues covered by previous free trade agreements as 
well as current and emerging trade issues. These five features are (1) comprehensive 
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market access by eliminating or reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers, (2) regional 
approach to commitments, (3) addressing new trade challenges by promoting innovation, 
productivity, and competitiveness, (4) inclusive trade by covering the issue of small and 
medium enterprises and capacity building in trade and development issues, and (5) 
platform for Pacific integration by an open membership system (USTR 2015). Once the 
TPP comes into force, it will bring a new approach to deal with wide range trade policy 
issues and transcending the extent of traditional trade agreements (Lakatos et al. 2016, p. 
229).  
Figure 1 TPP countries output 2006 - 2015 
 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
According to World Bank (2016) data as shown in Figure 1, the output of TPP economies 
was about US$ 27.5 trillion or accounted for 37.5 percent of world GDP in 2015. On 
average, TPP countries represent 38.4 percent of the global economy in the last decade. 
If Indonesia joined the TPP, there will be an additional one percent GDP into TPP, which 
means the role of TPP in the world’s economy become more important. In terms of trade, 
DFAT (2016) reports that TPP countries’ trade accounted for 25.9 percent of the world’s 
trade in 2014. With 819 million of population or 11.3 percent of the world’s population 
lives in TPP countries (DFAT 2016), TPP creates an opportunity to become a large and 
integrated market for products of its member nations. As the TPP membership is open to 
other Asia-Pacific economies (Lakatos et al. 2016, p. 219), it is possible for the TPP to 
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grow and broaden its coverage and subsequently, plays the more important role in Pacific 
region as well as the global economy.   
(2) The main principles of TPP 
There are several main TPP principles that could potentially encourage Indonesia to 
become more open and competitive economy. First, TPP implements the principle of freer 
trade and binding and enforceable commitments. Free trade defined as the exchange of 
money, goods and services over political barriers in the absence of restrictions, or in other 
words, the expansion of the of the “market” concept across state borders (Funderburk 
2011). Reduction in trade barriers is one of the main objectives in encouraging trade. The 
TPP has the potential to go beyond the WTO in regards to the tariff cuts and services 
liberalization among trading partners, as well as the evasion of complex and trade-
restricting rules of origin, thus brings a notable economic advantages (Lester 2014). TPP 
will enable high-level or comprehensive removal in tariff regarding its coverage and the 
deepness of tariff reductions. Tariff bindings encompass entire goods in each participant 
countries. The members of TPP in general cannot rise the tariff of goods, since they are 
tied in the commitments to reduce or eliminate tariff in the TPP. However, there are some 
exception that can narrow the horizontal application of the tariff bindings among 
members. For instance, in terms of the automotive sector, the US determined particular 
tariff treatment in importing goods from Japan. Tariff eliminations in the manufacturing 
sector include 12 member states, in general is more than 99 percent concerning both trade 
value and tariff lines. Finally, when the phase-out period ends, there will be no tariff 
barriers in almost every trade in goods (WEF 2016a, pp. 5-6). 
Moreover, the TPP also applies non-discrimination principle, which is interpreted as a 
compulsion to give an equal treatment to the countries, embodied in the most-favoured 
nation treatment (MFN) and national treatment (NT) and encompasses products, services 
and service suppliers (Qin 2005, p. 295). In the trade commitments in the investment area, 
TPP ensures the MFN principle obviously, in which multi-state regime countries have to 
provide an optimum investment circumstances to the foreign investor equally, regardless 
of the country of origin of the investors. Since the investment registration phase, Investors 
are also permitted to petition towards the government. In government procurement 
chapter, TPP enforces MFN and NT principles. Eliminating tender requirement that is 
more benefiting domestic bidders, for instances an obligation to use domestic suppliers 
or product, and term on the transfer of technology. TPP members should confirm their 
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tender procedures to secure their own interests in regards to substandard performance and 
poor capacity tenders, although the bidders offer significant inexpensive price as it is 
often done by China’s bidders (Massmann 2016). Furthermore, non-discrimination 
principle stipulates E-commerce and digital outputs and the decision of SOEs in making 
a purchase or sell to dis-incentivise monopoly power (Pelzman 2016). 
Furthermore, TPP promotes transparency principle. One of the main purposes of TPP is 
to enhance transparency and availability of information, conducting procedures for 
collaboration and consultation when market access circumstances adversely influence 
exports from one TPP economy to another (WEF 2016a, p. 4). TPP's stipulations 
encompass transparency on import and export licensing procedures, for instance, 
announcement procedures, and a ban that every party cannot undertake or preserve 
actions that are not in accordance with the import licensing procedures of WTO 
Agreement. Trade Barrier to trade (TBT) is one chapter in TPP covering transparency 
and stipulations for regulatory alteration, including allowing stakeholders to be involved 
in the establishment of technical rules, compatibility and standard evaluation procedures 
concerning no less beneficial than those for domestic constituencies. Furthermore, 
transparency and anti-corruption chapter in TPP encourage new and robust regulations 
concerning transparency in trade and investment. It provides regulations to diminish the 
fraud and bribery effects on investment, trade and government policies. The rules assure 
the exporters, investors, service suppliers, and other stakeholders within TPP gain access 
to information regarding all regulations, laws, assurances and due process rights (ibid, pp. 
7-17). 
Analysis 
(1) Economic benefits from joining TPP for Indonesia 
As a preferential trade agreement (PTA) scheme, the heart of TPP would be the process 
of reducing or removing tariff and non-tariff barriers. In terms of removing tariff, a PTA 
usually dictates no tariffs among members, but set member’s own tariff rates against non-
member nations. In the case of the pacific rim TPP, eliminating tariffs for intra-TPP trade 
is the main goal of its arrangement (Deardorff 2014, p. 5). According to Krugman et al. 
(2012), by removing tariffs, a PTA could potentially lead to: (1) trade creation, if joining 
a PTA leads to replacement of high-cost domestic production by imports from other 
members of the agreement, and (2) trade diversion, if joining a TPA leads to the 
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replacement of low-cost imports from outside the zone with higher-cost goods from 
member nations (p. 250).  
By joining the TPP, Indonesia could avoid the potential of trade diversion from current 
trading partner countries, mainly the United States and Japan. This is under the notion 
that Indonesia has similar export products to other TPP member countries, such as 
Vietnam and Malaysia. When the TPP comes into force, members would potentially 
divert their imports to other members in search for lower price of imported goods as a 
result of tariff-free trade. Deardorff (2014) argues that the level of an FTA to jeopardise 
non-member countries could be quantified from the amount of reduction in their exports 
(p. 10). 
According to WITS (2016a) data, Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia are exporters of 
manufactured goods, such as textiles, electronics, automotive parts and tires. For instance, 
in 2014, 40 percent of Indonesia’s export of textiles and clothing was to the United States 
and Japan (WITS 2016b). If Indonesia remained at the outside of the TPP, the role of 
Indonesia’s products could potentially be replaced by Malaysia and Vietnam’s as they are 
benefited from preferential tariffs and better market access the United States and Japan. 
In total, according to Shauki (2016), the potential loss of trade diversion that could be 
saved by Indonesia if joining the TPP is about US$ 600 million per year (p. 10).  
In addition, by joining the TPP, Indonesia could potentially be benefited from trade 
creation among TPP members. At the first stage, Indonesia could potentially correct 
current import tariffs imposed by trading partners for Indonesia’s products. Currently, the 
average of import tariffs imposed by TPP countries for Indonesia’s products is two 
percent. This average tariff increases to more than five percent if taking into account 
American countries only, including Canada, the United States, Mexico, Peru and Chile. 
Compared to other ASEAN countries, such as Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore, 
the imposed tariffs by American countries for Indonesia’s products are even higher. This 
condition indicates that Indonesia’s products are less competitive in these importing 
countries because of higher tariffs. By joining the TPP, Indonesia could enhance its export 
products’ competitiveness by removing tariff barriers imposed by its trading partners.  
 
 
  6 
Table 2 Indonesia’s exports and imports to TPP countries 2014 
 
Source: WITS (2016c); WITS (2016d); Ministry of Trade (2016). 
Furthermore, according to Indonesia’s Ministry of Trade data (2016), among 12 TPP 
members, Indonesia currently does not have free trade agreement with five of them, which 
are the American countries: The United States, Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile. While 
the United States is one of the most important Indonesia’s export destination countries, 
Indonesia’s exports to Canada, Mexico, Peru and Chile were relatively small. As shown 
in Table 2, Indonesia’s exports to these four countries accounted for only US$ 1.99 billion 
or 1.13 percent of Indonesia’s total exports in 2014. This fact raises the opportunity to 
expand Indonesia’s export to these four countries through trade creation under the TPP. 
Broader trade creation with the other member nations would also be triggered as Cheong 
et al. (2014) argue that in general, PTAs would create more trade between member 
countries through trade creation, while bilateral trade between two member countries 
would also remain positive and economically significant (p. 235). The potential increase 
in Indonesia’s export value caused by trade creation with TPP countries, according to 
Shauki (2016), would be about US$ 2.9 billion per year (p. 11). 
On the domestic side, trade creation effects from the TPP would also benefit the domestic 
consumers. Because the import tariffs will be decreased or will be removed based on the 
agreement, and Indonesia could replace more expensive domestic supply by the cheaper 
supply from TPP countries, domestic price of imported goods as well as the domestic 
substitutes will decrease, thus lead to raise consumer surplus and higher quantity 
consumed. Even though less competitive domestic producers will lose as a result of sales 
fall and lower price, and the government might lose revenue from tariffs, the net welfare 
No. Country
Export Value 
(US$ Million)
Export 
Partner 
Share (%)
Import Value 
(US$ Million)
Import 
Partner 
Share (%)
Free Trade Agreements
1 Australia 4,962                     2.82 5,648                     3.17 ASEAN-Australia-NZ
2 Brunei 100                         0.06 594                         0.33 ASEAN FTA
3 Canada 755                         0.43 1,860                     1.04 -
4 Chile 178                         0.10 242                         0.14 -
5 Japan 23,127                   13.14 17,008                   9.55 Indonesia-Japan (IJ EPA)
6 Malaysia 9,732                     5.53 10,855                   6.09 ASEAN FTA
7 Mexico 851                         0.48 187                         0.11 -
8 New Zealand 481                         0.27 836                         0.47 ASEAN-Australia-NZ
9 Peru 210                         0.12 67                           0.04 -
10 Singapore 16,752                   9.52 25,186                   14.14 ASEAN FTA
11 The USA 16,560                   9.41 8,189                     4.60 -
12 Vietnam 2,451                     1.39 3,418                     1.92 ASEAN FTA
Subtotal 76,161                   43.26 74,089                   41.58
Total of the year 176,036                 100 178,179                100
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effect of trade creation to a country is usually positive (Deardorff 2014, p. 10). The main 
reason why removing tariff barriers might result in an increase of welfare to a country is 
because it creates an efficiency case for free trade by eliminating the deadweight loss in 
term of production and consumption distortion caused by tariffs (Krugman et al.2012, p. 
220). Moreover, in the long term, trade creation would persistently encourage a country 
to specialise in producing the products in which they possess competitive advantages 
(Bamford & Grant 2014, p. 107). In addition, open markets between members of a PTA 
would also lead to a more efficient labour division, fostering technology transfer and 
diffusion, and subsequently, enhancing productivity growth (Hoekman & Javorcik 2006, 
pp. 19-22). 
(2) Challenges from joining TPP for Indonesia 
There are several possible challenges of joining TPP that should be a concern for 
Indonesia to optimise its benefits from TPP. Relatively weak competitiveness level of the 
domestic industry becomes a major challenge for Indonesia. While, TPP applies the 
assumption that the pro-competitive atmosphere that promote sanction for anti-
competitive measure and open markets is necessitated to apply the commitments related 
to trade effectively. Hence, the TPP entails the country members to set and implement the 
procedural framework for fair and transparent competition law (WEF 2016a, p. 31). The 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) is an approach developed by the World Economic 
Forum, consisting 12 competitiveness instruments to measure a country's competitiveness 
according to microeconomics and macroeconomics level. Improving competitiveness 
instrument will bring a positive impact on trade balance (Llatja 2015, pp. 188-192). 
Indonesia is ranked 37th for the GCI 2015-2016. This ranking is still below the majority 
of member countries of TPP, even compared with other countries in the Asia Pacific 
region, Indonesia is still far behind Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia and Chile (WEF 
2016b). With a population of 250 million, Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast 
Asia and it is a potential market for world trade. The low level of industrial 
competitiveness will only make Indonesia as an easy target for other TPP country 
members to sell their products. The flood of cheap import goods from other TPP country 
members in the domestic market will harm local producers (Kusumadewi 2016). 
In addition, the negative impact of trade erosion resulting from joining TPP will be the 
next challenge. Indonesia already has trade agreements outside the TPP with several 
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member countries of TPP, in which the agreement has entailed preferential tariffs for both 
export and import transaction. By joining the TPP, Indonesia will lose this exclusive 
preferential tariffs from the trade agreement outside the TPP, since TPP applies the same 
rights to tariff reductions for all member countries without discrimination. Preference 
erosion refers to preferential tariff, which disappears due to joining the TPP (Deardorff 
2014, p. 10). For example, Indonesia Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJ-EPA) 
which is bilateral trade agreement between Indonesia and Japan covering the reduction 
or elimination of more than 90% of the total tariff lines of the manufacturing industry 
(Tambunan 2008, p. 4). Based on the TPP agreement, Japan will levy the same import 
tariffs towards all TPP member countries.  
Moreover, Indonesia is considered too late to join the TPP, causing Indonesia lost the 
opportunity to incorporate the interests of the state in the rules and provisions of TPP in 
early stage. TPP which is an open-accession agreement allows other countries to join later 
on. Considering the advantages, Indonesia has expressed its desire in joining the TPP. 
Hence, Indonesia can no longer negotiate its special interests since TPP agreement has 
been officially signed. If Indonesia joins TPP, it must conform to the existing rules, terms 
and conditions. Not being a member since the beginning of TPP, Indonesia lost the 
momentum to have the bargaining power to establish provisions consistent with the 
national interest (Intan 2015). For instance, the application of Chapter 18 on Intellectual 
Property Rights, which regulates the rules of protection of intellectual property rights both 
in relation to the protection of brands, copyrights, geographical indications, patents and 
industrial designs (MFAT 2016). 
Unlike the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) of the WTO, which 
provides the flexibility for states to be able to override patents (IGJ 2016). Chapter 18 in 
this TPP will make TPP agreement as harmful trade pacts related to access to medicines 
in developing countries. This is because the rules of protection of intellectual property 
rights, particularly related to the patent will provide maximum protection against patent 
medicine and pharmaceutical company data that ultimately affect the monopoly of 
production and the price of medicines by the multinational pharmaceutical industry 
including generic medicines (MSF 2016). Furthermore, the provisions of Chapter 
Investment in TPP agreement will further give the right of pharmaceutical companies to 
be able to sue the state through the mechanism of Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS) regarding the regulations that can reduce their profit. As a developing country, 
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Indonesia has an interest to lose the exclusivity of intellectual property rights to 
manufacture cheaper generic medicines to the citizens. Indonesia loses an opportunity to 
affect this provision by not being a member of the TPP negotiations. 
Conclusion 
Considering the potential economic benefits and challenges in joining the TPP, Indonesia 
should take part of the TPP. By joining the TPP, Indonesia could avoid the trade diversion 
from trading partners as well as creating opportunities of new market expansion through 
trade creation with the TPP members. Specifically, Indonesia could expand its exports to 
the American countries which is previously unexploited. Joining the TPP would also 
benefit domestic consumers as they will obtain lower price on imported goods. However, 
a relatively weak competitiveness level of the domestic industry is a main challenge. It 
leads to the the flood of inexpensive import goods from other TPP country members in 
the domestic market that can hurt local producers. Indonesia should emphasis on the 
enhancement of the domestic industries competitiveness level to be able to compete with 
other TPP member countries, in order to gain the economic benefits from the TPP 
optimally.  
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